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ABSTRACT
As part of its National Development Programmes in the period
2007–2013 Hungary implemented venture capital instruments
to improve the competitiveness of small and medium sized
companies. The concrete instruments included both fully and
partly state-owned VC funds significantly increasing equity
finance available for the target group. In our article, we investi-
gate the impact of the state intervention on the quality of the
VC portfolios built through the programmes. We point out that
the key indicators of the portfolio do not promise a significant
increase in aggregate company value and they deteriorated in
the later years of the programme as the public funding was
increased. We draw the conclusion that the size and quality of
the venture capital market determines the efficient volume and
type of state intervention.
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1. The importance of the research
As part of the EU funded National Development Programme in the period
2007–2013 Hungary implemented venture capital instruments (the Jeremie1 VC pro-
gramme) to improve the competitiveness of small and medium sized companies. The
concrete instruments included both fully and partly state-owned VC funds signifi-
cantly increasing equity finance available for the target group. At the same time, the
Hungarian government implemented a wide range of other state financial pro-
grammes as well, funded partly from EU sources, partly from the national budget. In
our article, we investigate the impact of the state intervention on the quality of the
portfolios built by the partly state-owned VC funds between 2010 and 2016, in an
environment characterised by a high level of state aid.
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2. Literature review
“State aid is defined as an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a
selective basis to undertakings by national public authorities. Therefore, … gen-
eral measures open to all enterprises are not covered by this prohibition and do
not constitute state aid (examples include general taxation measures and employ-
ment legislation).” (European Commission, 2016) State intervention can take a
variety of forms, e.g., grants, interest and tax relief, guarantees, government hold-
ings of all or part of a company, or providing goods and services on preferential
terms, etc. State aid is basically banned in the EU (EU, 2012, Article 107), except
when there is a special reason to intervene, i.e., when a socially important eco-
nomic goal cannot be achieved due to market failure. Job creation, rural develop-
ment, and innovation are the most frequent objectives governments try to achieve
by providing state aid to enterprises.
Venture capital is one of the areas where the State can intervene by providing pub-
lic funding for SMEs. According to Lerner (2012) we cannot readily assume that gov-
ernments can effectively promote entrepreneurship and venture capital. One of the
reasons for this is that programmes aimed at boosting innovative entrepreneurs may
easily miss their target group, ending up benefiting associates of privileged persons.
Most of the authors point out that there is no guarantee for the success of interven-
tion when the State runs or promotes venture capital programmes.
The form and the extent of the government intervention are in constant flux as
they accord with economic needs. Governments can use multiple instruments to
stimulate market activity. Both direct and indirect forms of intervention can be dis-
tinguished. (Avots, Strenga & Paalzow, 2013, Lerner, 2012; Jaki & Molnar, 2017):
 Indirect government intervention is if the government invests in a venture capital
(VC) fund handled by a private VC fund manager. Another form is the tax incen-
tives such as tax shields for investment in VC and capital gains tax relief. There
are many other measures that are designed to ensure a competitive economic
environment for SMEs. For example, the banks’ loans can be supported by gov-
ernment guarantees, which can also indirectly develop the SME.
 Direct government intervention is when the state-owned VC funds management
companies handle EU and state-owned funds. Another direct intervention is when
the government organises training programmes and consulting opportunities for
SMEs to make them ready for VC investment, or when state-owned banks issue
credits to companies that often come with government guarantees.
An important – though very challenging – role for government is to intervene dir-
ectly in the entrepreneurial process (Lerner, 2012). It is important to avoid either too
large or too small initiatives. Programmes that are too small will be unlikely to have
significant impact and inflated expectations may create criticism. But efforts that are
too substantial run the risk of swamping the markets. The imbalance between plenti-
ful capital and limited investment opportunities may distort markets. Avots, Strenga
and Paalzow (2013) found that government intervention in the venture capital market
is essentially based on two assumptions:
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 insufficient private venture capital funding supply for new firms;
 the ability of the government that invests partly because of externalities such as
social impact, job creation, etc.
Moreover, Pergelova and Angulo-Ruiz (2014) found that government guarantees
and government equity have a direct effect on new firms’ competitive advantage and
only an indirect impact on performance. On the other hand, they mentioned that
some experts are concerned about the crowding out effect due to the direct involve-
ment in the VC market by the government. Based on an empirical survey made in
Canada, Cumming and MacIntosh (2006) stated that an increase in public venture
capital actually led to a reduction in overall venture capital supply, which means that
the public venture capital funds might crowd out classic private venture capital funds.
Conducting an overview of the public VC programmes in the Central and East
European region, Karsai (2017) concludes that in some EE countries the venture cap-
ital market may not be able to absorb the increased supply of capital. Considering the
strong pressure on the VC fund managers to allocate all the resources of the VC pro-
grammes, it is likely that investment conditions become softer than they would be in
a market without state intervention.
Leleux and Surlemont (2003) analysed venture capital markets in 15 EU countries
and found that in most of them (12) the public sector provided VC funds to promote
the expansion of the market.
Venture capital investments amount to a very small share of the total outside
financial sources of SMEs, usually below 2%. At the same time a much higher pro-
portion of government (public) intervention targets the venture capital market. In the
EU member countries 14% of the amount allocated for financial instruments (exclud-
ing grants) funded venture capital programmes in the period between 2009 and 2016.
The potential target companies of the VC market include early stage companies
and firms in the initial expansion stage. Companies in the seed and start-up stage do
not realise revenues, they are still working on their idea, creating the prototype of the
product or making the service available for their customers. In this stage they have a
negative net cash flow and bear a high risk (Jaki, Molnar, & Walter, 2017). When
evaluating the performance of portfolio companies it should be considered that their
net cash flow is necessarily negative after the VC investment since they start spending
cash on the development of their product or marketing. The value of the company
will rise after three to five years when the company realises its turnover and profits.
An SME financing gap is considered as a kind of market failure by the EU. SMEs’
access to finance is particularly pressing in new EU member countries, since most of
them report a widespread shortage of finance (European Commission, 2008).
Financing is necessary to setting up SMEs and expanding their operations, developing
new products, and employing new staff or production facilities. Banks are less willing
to finance SMEs generally and especially startups and very new firms (Walter, 2014).
If SMEs are not funded by banks or other financial suppliers, they may not launch a
business, which could mean a potential loss to the economy (Vasilescu, 2010). The
venture capital market in the CEE region is characterised by a limited number of
business angels and incubator organisations and by a high number of underfinanced
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promising start-ups. “… the use of predominantly hybrid funds’ forms of government
VC programmes were more challenging in the CEE region compared to western
Europe. However, the greatest risk of public equity schemes – the crowding out effect
on private investors – is absent in the CEE region because of the lack of private
investors.” (Karsai, 2018, p73).
An investment proposal should be evaluated both by the VC fund manager and by
the potential portfolio company (the owner of the intellectual property). Evaluating
companies is a very difficult task even in the case of an established business and it is
a more complex problem in the case of an early stage company.
The owners of intellectual property are not only interested in setting the pre-
money value of the firm high, but also have a tendency to be over-optimistic. A
financial plan is over-optimistic if forecasted data systematically deviate from actual
values in the positive direction, i.e., sales revenues are over-planned while costs are
under-planned (Lovallo, Viguerie, Uhlaner, & Horn, 2007 and Kahneman & Lovallo,
2003, Haw, Jung, & Ruland, 1994; Duru & Reeb, 2002). In financial planning, the
time required for execution and the cost factors are typically under-planned while
sales revenues are over-planned; consequently, results fall short of the plan. Krizan
and Windschitl (2007) defined over-optimism as people’s tendency to rate the likeli-
hood of desirable events higher than what it really is while underrating the probabil-
ity of non-desirable events. Over-optimism is of critical importance in budgeting
because owners have overly optimistic expectations about the company’s future.
Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg, (1988) found that entrepreneurs overrated the chan-
ces of success of their businesses even though they clearly saw the likelihood of fail-
ure in the case of those types of businesses.
A distinction must be made between the followings cases: 1) when planners
(internal analysts) have an inside view of the company’s opportunities and have their
own personal motivations such as start-uppers, and 2) when external analysts such as
investment managers of VC funds prepare or evaluate the forecasts of the potential
portfolio company’s performance, who can be regarded as being independent of the
company. An agreement on the pre-money value of the potential portfolio company
is a precondition for an investment decision. Although the two parties have contra-
dictory interests, they should share a realistically optimistic evaluation on intellectual
property generated in the project. The data on the stakes acquired by the VC fund
managers indicate that the optimism about the growth of company value of the par-
ties was very limited in many cases.
We should consider a further possible motivation of the potential portfolio firms.
Even if they do not count on growing company value and thus realising a return,
they may get funding for their project, including salaries for a couple of years. By
accepting low pre-money value, they gain time and money to continue operating.
Investing in firms characterised by this approach is not reasonable for return
driven VC fund managers because it would result in low-performing portfolios, while
absorption driven fund managers may have to invest in such firms if there are not
enough companies promising higher returns. VC fund managers under absorption
pressure bearing a very small proportion of loss but with a guaranteed management
fee would reasonably build portfolios even with a high probability of loss.
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While analysing the demand side we assume that entrepreneurs have a preference
in this ranking of financial resources. We demonstrated in the earlier part of the art-
icle that there was an abundant supply of subsidised financial resources available for
entrepreneurs in the period 2007–2016. Considering the overall price of outside
financial sources, we can conclude that the entrepreneurs’ preference ranking is the
following: grants, credit, leasing, factoring, and equity. For potential portfolio compa-
nies credit, factoring and leasing are not feasible options, but grants were available
for innovation projects. Potential portfolio companies often had the choice to fund
their projects from non-refundable money instead of from VC investments.
3. The development policy environment of the hungarian VC market
The goal of state intervention in the venture capital market is to improve access to
external finance for young innovative firms. The impact of such interventions
depends very much on the development policy context. Limited and targeted inter-
ventions may yield different results than the ones with a wide spectrum of target
areas and large volume of funds provided. The Hungarian government has run large-
scale enterprise development programmes in the last two decades.
In the period 2007–2016 Hungary provided over 2.5 times more state aid to enter-
prises than the EU average measured as a percentage of GDP and is among the three
countries spending an outstandingly high relative amount on state aid. Three-quarters
of the state aid was in the form of grants available mainly for small and medium
sized enterprises and innovation projects in the competitive sector.
Hungary allocated 30.8% of the European Structural and Investment funds
to its economic development and innovation operative programme (European
Union, 2014).
The Hungarian government runs preferential credit programmes applying a variety
of instruments; refinancing, guarantee, interest rate subsidies and direct loans issued
by state owned financial institutions. By 2014, 40% of SME loan stock was backed by
the government in some form (Sz€oll}osi & Pogacsas, 2014), which is an exceptionally
high proportion in a market economy. The credit types backed by the state cover a
very wide range including not only investment and working capital loans but also
overdraft loans. The Hungarian National Bank refinanced an SME loan programme
started in 2013, providing funds up to 70% of the SME credit stock at that time.
Technically this measure is not state aid since it is available for all SMEs.
The high level of state subsidies granted in the long run raises the question if this
is an efficient way of promoting entrepreneurship and innovation. Kallay (2014) ana-
lysed the major performance indicators of the Hungarian economy and found that
there is not a strong connection between the level of state intervention and
competitiveness.
In the period 2007–2016, four rounds of tenders were advertised and altogether 25
VC fund managers received funding from public resources; furthermore, a fully state-
owned fund and a fund manager was established in 2010. The large number of fund
managers strengthened the bargaining power of target companies allowing them to
choose from a multiple of offers from fund managers.
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In the case of the so-called “closed construction”, equity is to be paid back at the
end of the investment period with a predetermined return. The investment works as
credit in respect to cash flow. The state owned “Szechenyi T}okealap-kezel}o Zrt.”
(Szechenyi Capital Fund Management Plc.) anticipates a 12% to 15% return on its
investments, which is much lower than the expected return of one single investment
by other Hungarian or foreign fund VC funds (Jaki & Molnar, 2017).
4. Research questions
In the period subject to our research, the Hungarian government applied two forms
of state intervention in the VC market. One was investing public money up to 70%
into venture capital funds under the control of private fund managers (the “Jeremie”
initiative); the other was establishing fully state-owned funds handled by a state-
owned VC fund management company. The main question of our research is “what
was the impact of state intervention on the Hungarian venture capital market in the
period 2007–2016?” to be answered by the following sub-questions:
1. Did the high level of state intervention cause a crowding out effect?
2. How did the quality of portfolios change over time?
3. Has state intervention contributed to economic growth?
5. Period of the research, database and sources
The period of the research is the preparation, investment and exit period of the ven-
ture capital programmes funded from the budget of the 2007–2013 Hungarian
National Development Programme. The preparation and programme design started
in 2007, the first investments by the VC funds were made in 2010, and the final
deadline for VC investments was May 2016. The funds are supposed to be closed ten
years after their starts.
The primary database of our research consists of the data of the companies receiv-
ing investment in the VC programme of the 2007–2013 Hungarian National
Development Programme. Our dataset contains information on 353 companies based
on their total of 1305 annual balance sheets and financial statements for the financial
years 2010–2017. The annual report’s data and additional information about the com-
panies were collected form the Hungarian Ministry of Justice official database. In
cases where the equity investment was split between two or more years, we took the
year of the first investment transaction as the date of the investment. Our database
includes the following: total revenue, cost of goods sold, operating expenses, gross
profit and net earnings. From the assets side of the balance sheet we collected the fol-
lowing data: intangible assets; property, plant and equipment, investments, current
assets, and cash. From the liabilities side we composed the owner’s equity and
liabilities.
We also used secondary data provided by the Hungarian Private Equity and
Venture Capital Association (HVCA) on the total VC market and public VC funds
(HVCA, 2017).
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An obvious limitation of our research is that most of the investments have not
been closed and the availability of information on exits is limited.
6. Methodology
6.1. Share of public funds
We summed up the total VC investments (HUF billion), and the public funds
invested (HUF billion) in the periods 2002–2008 and 2009–2016, and we calculated
the following indicators:
Share of public funds ¼ Public funds invested HUF billionð Þ100
Total VC investments HUF billionð Þ
6.2. Closed down firms
We identified the companies that closed down their business by the end of 2017
based on the information of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice and the annual reports
submitted between 2010 and 2017:
Non-operating companies are the following:
 firms which failed to submit annual reports after a given year.
 firms which were liquidated in a legal process.
 firms which were legally deleted from the register of companies.
We calculated the following indicator:
Proportion of closed down firmst ¼
Number of closed down firms by 2017t
Number of firms receiving investmentt
where t is the year of investment.
6.3. Firms in which the VC fund has a share exceeding 50%
We collected information on owners and their shares from the financial statements of
the portfolio companies and calculated the following indicator:
Proportion of VC50þ firmst ¼
Number of VC50þ firms receiving investmentt
Number of firms receiving investmentt
where t is the year of investment and VC50þ denotes the firms in which the share of
the VC fund exceeds 50%.
To discover how the quality of portfolios changed over time and whether the
absorption pressure affected them we used the following indicators:
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6.4. Revenue dynamics (change of revenues)
Change of revenuest;i ¼ Revenuest;iRevenuest;0
Where t denotes the year of investment, i is for the number of years after the
investment is made (i¼ 0 indicates the year of investment.)
6.5. Net earnings on revenue
Net earnings on revenuet ¼ Net earningstTotal revenuet
6.6. Net earnings on equity
Net earnings on equityt ¼
Net earningst
Equityt
6.7. Change of intangible assets
Change of intangible assetst;i ¼ Intangible assetst;iIntangible assetst;0
7. Results
We present our research results in two subchapters; first we analyse the Hungarian
VC market then we investigate the portfolios of the Jeremie VC funds.
7.1. The Hungarian venture Capital market between 2002 and 2016
Before the financial crisis (2002–2008) the Hungarian venture capital market was
dominated by investments from off-shore funds (registered abroad). There were nei-
ther privately-owned nor mixed public-private funds registered in Hungary operating
under the domestic regulation. Because of a revised regulation introduced in 2002,
establishing venture capital funds in Hungary became a real option. (The preceding
regulation set unrealistic conditions for VC funds registered in Hungary.)
Two government owned venture capital funds operated on the market (CELIN
and IKTA). Venture capital investments amounted to HUF 71.9 billion (approxi-
mately EUR 287.6 million) out of which HUF 3 billion (EUR 12 million) or 4.1% of
the total market was made up of public funds. In this period the private and public
investments were separated both at the fund and individual transaction level.
Government intervention on the VC market was also strong by international com-
parison. From among the Central and East European EU member states Hungary
provided the highest amount of state resources to VC funds in the programming
period of 2007–2013. EUR 819 million were invested by the governments in the
region, EUR 378 million or 46.2% out of this amount in Hungary (Karsai, 2017).
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In 2008 the Hungarian government advertised the opportunity for VC fund
managers to apply for up to 70% of co-funding from the national development
programme. All the eight, qualifying venture capital fund managers were estab-
lished after the tender was opened, with the aim of taking the co-funding oppor-
tunity. There were four additional rounds of the venture capital programme and
all the winning fund managers were established in order to apply for public funds.
This development can be regarded as one that stimulated the Hungarian venture
capital market by attracting new fund managers. An important question is, how-
ever, whether the initial stimulus of public funds generates more private capital
investments, or the market remains dependent on additional government money.
After the financial crises (2009–2016) the yearly average volume of investments grew
slightly from HUF 10.3 to 10.9 billion (EUR 41.1 to 43.6 million). The dramatic change
in the market was due to the enormous increase in public funding growing to as high
as 86.2% of the total market (See Table 1). The majority of the public capital came
from EU resources within the framework of the national development programme.
The newly registered fund managers started their operations in a market character-
ised by a high share of state funds with an absorption pressure. After the allocation
of resources for the venture capital programme, there was no opportunity to decrease
the amount. The inflexibility of the system became especially clear during the finan-
cial crisis that erupted in 2008. Venture capital markets reacted by a significant drop
in investment level while the publicly funded Hungarian VC funds still had the same
investment targets. The absorption pressure increased after the crisis because the gov-
ernment allocated additional resources as part of the 2007–2013 Hungarian National
Development Programme for the venture capital market. The main reason for this
decision was the absorption pressure at the level of financial programmes generally.
The EU funded credit and guarantee programmes issued and backed fewer loans
than the decision-makers had expected, and venture capital seemed to be an easier
way to use up resources allocated for innovation and enterprise development. For the
second half of the 2007–2013 development programme an additional 75% of the ori-
ginal amount was allocated for venture capital fund managers.
We can draw the conclusion that the state intervention on the Hungarian VC mar-
ket caused a crowding out effect because private capital was replaced by public funds
while the level of investments hardly changed.
7.2. The quality of the portfolios built by the VC funds
A venture capital market dominated by private (non-public) investors is driven by
expected and actual return on invested capital. In the long run the return on venture
capital funds is very close to the return on other types of investment simply because
Table 1. Venture capital investments total market and public funds.
2002–2008 2009–2016
Total VC investments (HUF billion) 71.9 87
Yearly average investment (HUF billion) 10.3 10.9
Public funds invested (HUF billion) 3 75
Share of public funds % 4.1 86.2
Source: Statistics published by the Hungarian Venture Capital Association (HVCA, 2017; Karsai 2017; own database).
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the market mechanisms would narrow large gaps; investors would reallocate their
assets to investment instruments promising higher returns. On a VC market with a
high share of public money and the necessity to invest funds by a fixed deadline,
decisions are driven by absorption pressure. A fund manager would refuse a potential
investment with low expected return (considering the level of risk and likelihood of
success together) on a market dominated by private money because his portfolio
would not perform well with such investments. The fund manager with absorption
pressure may approve a transaction with similar parameters even it makes the
performance of his portfolio worse since his key indicator is investing all the
funds before the deadline. Consequently, he would keep investing after the projects
with high enough returns run out, because reallocation of assets is not possible. The
only way to spend the allocated money is to build a portfolio with a lower
expected return.
If intellectual property represented by the projects has a low pre-money value, the
stake of the project owners must remain low, i.e., VC funds will receive majority
stakes in the portfolio companies for their investment in cash. These transactions can
be considered as a kind of quasi investment because fund managers do not expect to
realise return by usual forms of exit (selling the whole company), but instead obligate
the project owners to buy back the VC fund’s stake at the end of the exit period. The
owners of intellectual property accept a minority stake because they also know that
the value of their project is low and hope to fund the development of their project
from the VC investment. This makes risk and uncertainty very high, resulting in low
performing portfolios.
Furthermore, as VC funds own the majority stake in the portfolio companies, in
the event of failure they bear the bulk of the risk. Considering that the State is either
the majority or full owner of most of the capital funds, public funds will suffer losses,
while privately owned fund managers are fully paid for their services.
Table 2 shows that during the venture capital programme the number of transac-
tions implemented by the VC funds in a year grew. We must take into account that
the transactions in 2016 were postponed from 2015 and took place in the first quarter
of the year. The bulk of the transactions were terminated in the second half of the
programme period. At the same time venture capital funds acquired a majority inter-
est in most of the cases; only in 2010 and 2011 was the proportion of firms in which
the VC funds have a majority stake less than 50%.
Table 2. Share of closed down firms, and firms in which the VC fund has a majority stake by the
year of investment.
Year of
investment
Number of
investments Unit
Proportion
of CLOSED
DOWN firms %
Proportion of firms
in which the VC fund
has majority stake %
2010 17 11.8 47.1
2011 27 33.3 37.0
2012 29 24.1 72.4
2013 35 20.0 55.9
2014 96 9.4 57.1
2015 63 12.7 56.7
2016 86 5.8 57.8
Average/SUM 353 13.3 56.3
Source: Own database of Hungarian VC investments 2010-2016.
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We analyse the quality of the VC portfolios built as part of the 2007–2013 Hungarian
Jeremie VC Programme. We must keep in mind that the VC portfolios usually do not
produce high revenues and profits in the early years. The cash invested in the firms must
serve the purpose of making the intellectual property of the innovators more valuable.
Losses in the first years are natural, revenue and net earnings would grow later so the
indicators of a good quality portfolio show significant change over time; after initial losses
revenues and profits start growing. To show the performance of the portfolio, we divided
it into seven subsets by the year of investment and present the indicators of each subset
from the beginning of the investment period.
The zero point on the x axis of Figures 1-4 is the year when the VC fund invested
in the company and indicator values of the seven groups are shown in relative time.
This method makes the indicators comparable showing how they perform year
by year.
As a rule of thumb, the dynamic growth of a firm’s revenue is a precondition of
the increasing company value because in most cases it is the basis for higher profits.
Even if a part of the portfolio companies fails, the rest of the firms must produce
dynamic growth to increase the future value of the portfolio.
Figure 1 shows that the portfolio subset receiving investments in 2010 had the
highest revenue dynamics while subsequent years lag behind, indicating that their
business potential is smaller. Furthermore, the growth rate of the turnover demon-
strates a declining trend.
Profitability, the firm’s capacity to generate income for the owners is a decisive fac-
tor for potential buyers of the stake held by the VC fund. For future investors or
buyers of the stake of the VC funds the most important question is how high the
return on their investment can be.
Companies that received investment in the first two years of the programme
(2010–2011) have the highest change of net earnings on revenues. The outstanding
value of the 2011 portfolio in the third year (2014) of the investment period is
Figure 1. Change of revenue of the portfolio firms by year of investment.
Source: data collected by the authors
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caused by one firm that received a EUR 140,000 grant from the European
Research Council. Portfolio companies receiving VC funding in the subsequent
years have produced somewhat lower figures so far. Figure 2 also shows that the
Figure 2. Net earnings on revenue of the portfolio firms by year of investment.
Source: data collected by the authors
Figure 3. Change of net earnings on equity of the portfolio firms by year of investment.
Source: data collected by the authors
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total net earnings of the portfolio are still negative, outside the exceptional value
of the 2011 portfolio subset, and only the 2010 portfolio subset produced positive
value in 2017.
There seems to be no clear growing trend in the change of the net earnings on
equity. The volatility of the data is partly explained by fact that some of the compa-
nies with negative equity have been closed down and this increases the net equity
value of the portfolio. The outstanding figure of the part of the portfolio for 2011 in
year three (2014) is caused by the firm mentioned above. Even though 53 poorly per-
forming firms had been closed down and eliminated from the portfolio by 2017 there
seems to be no significant improvement in profitability. The cumulated loss of the
portfolio was over HUF 50 billion by the end of 2017, which constitutes 70% of the
total capital investment by the VC funds. This means that the bulk of the resources
for development has already been spent. The trend is a deteriorating one; profitability
of later years’ portfolios shows lower figures.
The equity provided by the VC funds is meant to finance the development of the
projects of the portfolio firms. The result could be an increase in the intangible assets
of the companies. The trend we see in Figure 4 is not promising; after the initial
increase, the intangible assets decline indicating that this important element of com-
pany value would not attract new owners to most of the firms.
Having been almost over the development period, the current state of the portfolio
suggests that the programme would not generate significant economic growth.
8. Conclusions
After analysing the Hungarian VC market in the period 2007–2016 and the portfolios
built by the VC funds in the Jeremie programme we can try to answer our research
Figure 4. Change of intangible assets of the portfolio firms by year of investment.
Source: data collected by the authors
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questions, to characterise the impact of state intervention on the Hungarian venture
capital market.
8.1. Did the high level of intervention cause a crowding out effect?
Our analysis shows that although the state allocated significant resources to funding
VC investments from 2010, the value of average yearly investment barely grew, while
the share of public resources on the market increased from 4% to 86%. Public fund-
ing did not work as an additional source of finance, instead most of it replaced pri-
vate money.
8.2. How did the quality of portfolios change over time?
The indicators we analysed show that the quality of the portfolios of individual years
have a deteriorating trend compared to the performance in the same period after the
investment, implying that the increasing volume of public funding and investment
transactions resulted in softer project selection standards.
8.3. Has state intervention contributed to economic growth?
The revenue dynamics, net earnings on revenue, net earnings on equity, and the
change of intangible assets does not promise such an increase in the value of the
portfolio. Our assessment in the current stage of the programme is that value of the
whole portfolio is likely to end up below the value of the investment of VC funds.
The inflexible and relatively high supply of public resources result in absorption
pressure and through that a softer selection process. The venture capital market is a
complex system that provides funding for companies with high growth potential after
a selection process. Although uncertainty is very high, and it is difficult to foresee
risks in this process the main function of the market is to build viable portfolios with
the highest possible return. If the supply shock changes the preferences of the VC
fund managers and makes their attitude absorption oriented giving up return orienta-
tion, the market would not fulfil its main function, instead – because of the softer
selection process – the expected return of the portfolios would be lower including the
possibility of being negative. The result may be a counter effective venture capital
market that does not stimulate innovation. An additional problem could be generated
by the supply shock. Innovators, developers, and start-uppers get a misleading mes-
sage about what projects are viable, because it is too easy to get funding. They pay
less attention to preparing their projects, seeking a product-market fit, finding cus-
tomers, users, and generally building up the business potential of their projects. Thus,
supply shock changes the approach of the players who could produce the intellectual
property, a basic element of a venture capital market, and the result could be inves-
ting in projects with low pre-money value.
We identified early signs of deterioration on the Hungarian venture capital market
in the period 2010–2016: investing in projects with low intellectual property, prolifer-
ation of quasi investments and minimising private risk in the VC funds.
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Our general conclusion is that the capacity of a venture capital market determines
the efficient level and structure of state intervention. Increasing supply of VC funds
in itself would not automatically result in more value added generated by small
innovative firms, because a supply shock can cause deterioration of the market by
changing the approach of the key players.
Note
1. Jeremie stands for “Joint European Resources for Small to Medium Sized Enterprises”
i.e., the financial instruments jointly funded by the national development programmes
and private capital in the EU member countries in the programming period 2007–2013.
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